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The Banking Union is the result of 'unavoidable legal contortions and 
political compromises'.1  The forthcoming evolution of EMU is geared towards 
completing the Banking Union (BU) with a Single deposit insurance/EDIS.2 However, the 
first two pillars, namely the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM), are not entirely sound from a legal perspective. Indeed, 
such ambitious measures would require changes in the current legal framework. Sections 
1 to 3 of this paper explain the principal legal challenges to the framework, while 
section 4 explains what would be required to ensure a sounder legal footing for these 
measures.  
1. The legal bases for the BU framework questioned
One of the core problems is the lack of a suitable provision within the Treaties that 
empowers the EU legislator to create the elements of Banking Union. The wording of the 
Treaty provisions puts some limits in terms of the components and scope of the policies 
adopted (its substance), sometimes together with the instruments that could be used to 
implement the policies (the form of the acts). Indeed, the legal bases used so far to adopt 
1
N. Moloney, ‘European Banking Union: Assessing Its Risks and Resilience’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law
Review 1609. 
2
 European Deposit Insurance Scheme, Five Presidents' Report, 'Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary 
Union', 22 June 2015. 
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the legislation establishing the BU were highly controversial, notably because they were 
interpreted in a broad manner. From a legal perspective, the respect of legal bases is 
fundamental and constitutes the primary step to ensure the soundness of the decision-
making.  
More precisely, the decision-making process at the foundation of the BU raised some issues. 
The new regulations framing the BU are based on specific provisions in the Treaties. This 
choice is essential insofar as it affects which institutions are taking part into the decision-
making process (especially the involvement of the European Parliament, hereinafter EP) and 
determines the voting systems of the decision-making creating the new mechanisms 
(unanimity, qualified majority vote). As a consequence, the bargaining powers of the various 
parties could differ and influence the substance of the legislation adopted.  
Regarding the SSM, the European Parliament was not involved in the decision-making 
process under the Treaty provision used,3 as the Council acted by means of regulations. 
Under this procedure, the European Central Bank (ECB hereinafter) and the EP are only 
consulted. However, the amendment to another piece of legislation concerning the 
European Banking Authority (EBA Regulation4) realised by the EP and the Council rebalanced 
the scheme somewhat, giving the opportunity to the EP to influence the regulatory 
framework put in place by the SSM.  
On another ground, the SSM's legal basis provides for the conferral of 'specific tasks upon 
the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance 
undertakings' (art. 127(6) TFEU). This word 'specific' suggests that the powers conferred on 
the ECB by the SSM Regulation are too broad within the actual boundaries of the Treaties, 
exceeding the competences provided for in this paragraph.5 Indeed, authors pinpointed the 
extensive interpretation of this article used to establish the SSM, already when the SSM was 
                                                          
3
 The article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides : 'The Council, 
acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after 
consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European 
Central Bank (...).' (emphasis added). 
4
 Article 114 TFEU is its legal basis. It is a provision for the establishment and the functioning of the Internal 
Market, providing for an ordinary legislative procedure.  
5
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (SSM Regulation), (OJ L 287, 
29.10.2013, p. 63). 
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discussed by the legislators and drafted by the European Commission.6  In a narrow reading, 
does the adoption of the SSM represent only specific supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB 
and the National Competent Authorities? In this sense, the adjective specific is distinguished 
from general supervisory tasks (which could cover Banking Supervision as a whole). On the 
contrary, a wider reading of the Treaty Article has been suggested: that it is invitation to the 
legislator to enumerate supervisory tasks within a regulation, in a wider reading of this 
paragraph.7 This draws some support from Article 4 of the SSM Regulation, which provides 
for the 'tasks conferred on the ECB'.  In any case, a 'convincing alternative or complementary 
legal basis' to the article used as a legal basis for the SSM was not available at the time of its 
adoption,8 and this required some imaginative interpretation of the existing rules. But it also 
makes the case for Treaty change to facilitate better focussed legislation (see section 4 infra.) 
The setting-up of the SRM9 was debated as well because the Internal Market provision on 
which the SRM Regulation is based was not seen as supporting the obligation on Member 
States to mutualise resolution funds. Finally, part of the functioning of the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF) is regulated outside the Treaties by the adoption of an international agreement 
signed by 26 Member States,10 meaning that the EP was put aside from the decision-making 
process and the Community method was circumvented. As a consequence, it raised 
concerns of legitimacy in the negotiations11 and democratic participation in Treaty-making. 
Both the European Parliament and the national parliaments should be involved as 
stakeholders in an 'optimal design' of the EMU more generally.12 However, the situation in 
the case of the SRF's establishment was the result of a lack of an adequate legal basis 
available within the Treaty framework to allow the transfer of the contributions collected by 
the National Resolution Authorities to the Fund and the mutualisation of the financial 
resources from the national compartments.  
                                                          
6
 See for instance R. Goyal et al., 'A Banking Union for the Euro Area', (2013) IMF Staff Discussion Note, 
SDN/13/01, 31 .  
7
 J. Faull, Former Director General, Financial Stability, Financial Services, Capital Markets Union – European 
Commission, 'The law of the Banking Union', College of Europe, Bruges, 12-13 March 2015. 
8
 B. Wolfers, T. Voland, 'Level the playing field: The new supervision of credit institutions by the European 
Central Bank', (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review, Issue 5, pp.1463–1495. 
9
 Under article 114 TFEU. 
10
 Sweden and the UK did not sign. Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single 
Resolution fund, EF 121, ECOFIN 342 [2014] OJ 8457/14.  
11
 In the end, the EP was invited by the Council to participate in the negotiations.  
12
 As discussed with participants to the Workshop on the 11
th
 December 2015.  
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On the other hand, having recourse to this device to set up the SRF added further complexity 
to the legal background of the BU. What Professor Moloney refers to as 'institutional 
pragmatism' results also from the political compromise found under pressure from 
Germany.13 From a legal perspective, the constraints are due to the principle of conferral 
and the obligation to be in conformity with Member States budgetary sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) implemented to monitor the resolution pillar 
had to cope with constitutional limitations as an EU agency. In legal terms, this agency has to 
comply with the Meroni doctrine.14 This doctrine stands for the proposition that only limited 
the powers may be delegated from the EU institutions to an EU agency. This delegation may 
only take place if the agency has clearly defined executive powers (not discretionary powers) 
and is subject to the supervision of the Commission. In practical terms, it means that the 
Commission checks the SRB's power to determine if the SRF need to be called upon to 
financially assist any ailing banks15. The consequence is that the decision is then not that of 
an independent regulator but of a political organ, which may make suboptimal decisions.   
2. The powers of the various agencies/actors created and their relations  
 The SSM is shaped with a multi-layered governance structure and a sensitive division 
of responsibilities. A sketch of the administrative bodies involved is proposed through a 
simplified analytical framework to explain the different divergence risks in the current 
supervisory scheme, jeopardizing its effectiveness. These risks rely on a resurgence of home 
bias and the expression of national discretion by some supervisory authorities, which were 
supposed to be thwarted by the SSM.  
2.1. Risks of divergence affecting the effectiveness of the operational supervision 
 Firstly, the risks lie in divergent interpretations at a vertical level, between the ECB 
and the National Competent Authorities (NCAs hereinafter). Especially for the less significant 
credit institutions,16 there are risks of divergences in the implementation and interpretation 
of the same supervisory measure among the different NCAs. The Five Presidents' Report 
highlighted the remaining margin for national discretions 'notably for the quality and 
                                                          
13
 Moloney, above n.1 
14
 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957-58] ECR 133. 
15
 Article 19, SRM Regulation.  
16
 The credit institutions which are not systemic, in conformity with the definition under art. 6, SSM Regulation.  
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composition of banks' capital'.17 What is more, the ECB could not intervene quickly enough 
due to insufficient visibility from the NCAs or in other words, because of asymmetries of 
information.18 For instance, the riskiness of certain banks portfolios could be unobservable 
by the central supervisor, the ECB.  
 Adopting a principal-agents analysis, the ECB acts as the supranational agency 
responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM19 and its oversight relies 
on information collected by 'local supervisors'20 (in particular for indirect supervision). The 
question arises about what types of incentives or control mechanisms exist to ensure that 
the agents – the NCAs – behave in conformity with the will of the principal – the ECB.21 In 
the current framework, the incentives are not sufficient to overcome national bias, NCAs 
keeping the possibility to develop their own preferences diverging from those of the ECB. 
Indeed, a 'zone of discretion' is remaining within the NCAs' supervisory actions insofar as 
both ex ante and ex post control mechanisms are not entirely effective in aligning their 
actions with the ECB's supervisory directions.22  
Some mechanisms for intervening ex ante cover the SSM's supervisory manual, the Common 
supervisory procedure23, and the NCAs' notification of their supervisory procedures and 
decisions.24 Their effectiveness in ensuring a single approach is questionable especially for 
the first one – being mainly soft law – and for the third mechanism, which is partially at the 
NCAs' discretion. Furthermore, ex post control mechanisms rely on the intervention of 
external actors (EBA identifying breaches of EU Law by NCAS, infra Section 2.3. or National 
parliaments requesting public hearings from NCAs, article 21(3), SSM Regulation). Finally, the 
                                                          
17
 Five Presidents' Report, 'Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union', 22 June 2015, p.11. 
18
 Special thanks to Matic Petricek (EUI Economics department) for his insightful comments on this part, 
discussed during the 11
th
 December 2015 Workshop 'Legal Institutional Dimensions of EMU : Economists and 
Legal Scholars in Discussion' (EUI, Florence). 
19
 Art. 6(1) SSM Regulation. 
20
 E. Carletti, G. Dell'Ariccia, and R. Marquez, 'Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union' (2015), Working Paper 
Bocconi University, March 4, 2015, pp.1-2. 
21
 In line with the theory of agency, the coordination between the ECB-NCAs and the SRB-NRAs could entail 
delegation risks within respectively the SSM and the SRM. 
22
 J. Gren, 'Institutional design of supranational banking supervision in the Single Supervisory Mechanism: a 
view from a principal-agent perspective', (2014), European Consortium for Political Research – Salamanca, 10-
15 April 2014. 
23
 Part V, SSM Framework Regulation. 
24
 Part VII, Title 1, SSM Framework Regulation.  
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reporting duty on NCAs' own initiative25 could be misused and the ECB could remain 
uninformed of some NCAs' supervisory procedures.  
However, specific mechanisms bring back efficient incentives on the NCAs' conduct, such as 
the threat that the ECB will take over the supervision from the NCAs and intervene directly26, 
constituting a 'discipline device for local supervisors'.27 However it remains to be seen how 
credible a threat this instrument will become. 
 Secondly, at a horizontal level, there could be risks of divergences between the NCAs 
themselves, in particular when there is a need to transpose a measure in each Member State 
(the transposition takes place in each legal system of the MS participating in the BU, from an 
EU directive). Specifically, a risk of regulatory arbitrage rests on the indirect supervision 
assumed by the NCAs. The possible inconsistencies between NCAs' supervisory actions (infra) 
could entail a leeway for banks: they could choose to be headquartered where the NCAs' 
supervision is the most opportune for them.  
Despite the Single rulebook and its ongoing development, a margin of discretion still exists in 
the implementation and interpretation of supervisory standards by the NCAs.28 Thus, there 
is an inherent tension between reaching a centralised regulatory approach at the EU level 
and leaving room to National supervisory authorities for exercising domestic options,29 
discretions and practices.30 For instance, the CRD IV package is said to include 80 options and 
national discretions left to Member States and competent authorities, creating risks of 
'protectionist purposes or supervisory forbearance'.31 
                                                          
25
 Art. 97(4), SSM Framework Regulation. '4. In addition to the information requirements set out by the ECB in 
accordance with this Article, NCAs shall, on their own initiative, notify the ECB of any other NCA supervisory 
procedure which: 
(a) they consider material; or 
(b) may negatively affect the reputation of the SSM.' 
26
 article 6 (5)(b) SSM Regulation. 
27
 Carletti  et al. Above n.16, p.4. 
28
 A. Enria, Chairman of the European Banking Authority, 'The Single Rulebook in banking: is it ‘single’ enough?', 
Università di Padova, 28  September 2015. 
29
 For instance, the options granted to Member States in the Regulations : Where the Union law is composed of 
Regulations and explicitly grants options for Member States, the ECB must apply also the national legislation 
exercising those options, Article 4(3), SSM Regulation. 
30
 Enria, above n.28, p.1 
31
 Ibid, p.4-5. 
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 Thirdly, the relations between the ECB and the EBA remain uncertain. There are some 
interactions in both directions, the ECB influencing the EBA, and vice versa. This raises an 
important issue regarding the principle of institutional balance. While the ECB has a non-
voting representative in the EBA Board of Supervisors,32 the EBA is not a permanent 
observer in the ECB Supervisory Board.  
 Finally, this division of supervisory tasks within the mechanism (between ECB and 
NCAs and among NCAs) and outside thereof (EBA) is supplemented by Joint Supervisory 
Teams (JSTs), including staff from both the ECB and NCAs, which intervene in the day-to-day 
supervision of significant credit institutions. Thus, JSTs' action might overcome some risks by 
ensuring consistent and homogenous supervisory practices33. Furthermore, they could 
reconcile the ECB's utility function with those of the NCAs, because local agencies have 
inherently different utility functions: they are less inclined to intervene in Banks than the 
central supervisor.34 The JSTs could facilitate the exchange of information between 'the 
spokes and the hub'.35 
 All these risks adversely contradict the objective given to the SSM to implement in a 
'coherent and effective manner' Union's prudential supervision policy.36 In addition, the 
issue of distribution of information and transparency is topical and was emphasised by 
Danièle Nouy as an 'essential tool to coordinate supervisory actions across banks in a 
harmonised and proportionate way.'37  
2.2. Regulatory functions of the agencies involved and legal instruments used 
 The ECB should not compromise the EBA's regulatory role38 to prepare delegated or 
implementing acts for credit institutions to be adopted by the Commission.39 However, there 
                                                          
32
 Article 3 (2) SSM Regulation, and article 40(1), EBA Regulation as amended. 
33
 Additional support and technical expertise from DG Micro-Prudential supervision IV (ECB) may be required by 
JSTs. 
34
 As argued by Carletti et al. 2015 (above n.16, p.2), the NCAs as local supervisors bear greater risks in terms of 
reputational and fiscal costs, and are exposed to a higher degree of regulatory capture 'to which a central 
supervisor would not be subjected' (see also Agarwal Sumit, David Lucca, Amit Seru, and Francesco Trebbi, 
'Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking', 2014, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 129(2), pp.889-
938). 
35
 Carletti et al. 2015, Ibid., p.4. The authors mention the appointment of 'multi-country teams headed by 
SSM's officials'. 
36
 Recital 12, SSM Regulation.  
37
 SSM Priorities for 2016 
38
 Recital 32, SSM Regulation.  
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is a risk of overlaps as the regulations adopted by the ECBmight cover more than only its 
supervisory mandate.40  Indeed, the ECB might provide some binding indications to the 
regulator in its supervision. Therefore, the ECB could trample upon the EBA's powers and 
functions concerning the participating Member States (Euro area Member States for now). 
Then, it could become a 'competing standard-setter' through its instructions and guidelines, 
likely to attain 'quasi-regulatory colour.'41 Some authors predict a split between the EBA 
maintaining its prerogatives for the non-euro area Member States and the ECB, becoming 
the main regulator of banks in the euro area.42 In the short-run, operational supervision 
could be conducted in this framework (with soft law – guidelines or handbooks – ensuring 
cooperation between the institutions) but in the long term, the ideal outcome would be that 
non-euro Member States join the BU, allowing for a real and functional distinction between 
the ECB as mainly a supervisor and the EBA as a regulator for the whole EU. 43  Otherwise, 
the split described could be endorsed in the framework, with the flaw of admitting 'two 
blocks' in banking supervision, at the cost of EU wide banking integration.    
A related legal issue relates to the application of directives by the ECB in its supervisory tasks. 
Indeed, the ECB must apply all relevant Union law, and where the law is composed of 
directives, the national legislation transposing those directives (reaching to at least 19 
different national laws). 44  From a policy perspective s would be advantageous in ensuring 
uniformity in the supervisory scheme, but from a legal perspective it is not clear how the ECB 
as a supervisor could use directives and their transposition to adopt a decision. Finally, if a 
decision is contested by a supervised entity, the challenge goes through an Administrative 
Board of Review45 (ABoR, established by the ECB). The ABoR examines the conformity of the 
decisions with the SSM Regulation and adopts an Opinion. As a result of the Opinion, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
39
 Draft Binding Technical Standards (BTS) developed by the EBA and adopted by the Commission, in 
compliance with Meroni doctrine. 
40
 under article 132 TFEU. 
41
 This is noted by Moloney, above, n.1 
42
 See for example G. Lo Schiavo, 'From national banking supervision to a centralized model of prudential 
supervision in Europe ? The stability function of the Single Supervisory Mechanism', (2014) 21 Maastricht 
Journal 110 
43
 Enria (above n.24) calls for an 'attribution of regulatory tasks to the EBA, together with its role on supervisory 
convergence and cooperation', as 'an essential pillar of an institutional set-up in which supervision is not 
centralised for the whole EU, which remains a multi-currency area'. 
44
 Article 4(3), SSM Regulation. 
45
 Internal administrative review regulated by Article 24, SSM Regulation. A request to the ABoR does not affect 
the right to bring proceedings before the CJEU (art. 24(11)). See also Decision of the ECB concerning the 
establishment of an Administrative Board of Review and its Operating Rules (ECB/2014/16). 
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Supervisory Board might have to submit a new draft decision to the Governing Council, 
abrogating the initial decision.  
2.3. Principle of institutional balance 
 The EBA has power over the ECB as well. For instance, the EBA could give instructions 
to NCAs in case of a breach of Union Law,46 in an emergency situation,47 and in the context 
of cross-border conflicts between national supervisory authorities.48 The EBA's decisions 
'prevail over any previous decision adopted by the competent authorities on the same 
matter'.49 This raises a 'constitutional conundrum': the ECB is an institution of EU primary 
law (Treaties), whereas the EBA has been established by secondary law (Regulations). How 
could the ECB be subject to the EBA? Is it clearly a hierarchical relationship in practice?50 
As a conclusion on the institutional interactions between the SSM and the EBA, adjustments 
of the EBA's decision-making were adopted with the aim to protect the Member States' 
NCAs currently not participating in the BU from being outvoted by a participating Member 
States majority within the EBA Board of Supervisors (indeed the Member States within the 
BU could form a coalition in the EBA decision voting process to defend their interests as euro 
area Member States). The shift has been towards a double-majority voting system. Indeed, 
the EBA Board of supervisors decides on the basis of a qualified majority which includes a 
simple majority of Member States participating in the SSM and a simple majority of non-
participating Member States. 
3. Euro-area – Internal Market asymmetries  
 A new structure – the Supervisory Board – has been established within the ECB. The 
institutional analysis proved that there is a de facto division between euro Member States 
(mandatory membership) and non-euro Member States (currently outside the SSM). This 
entails risks of marginalisation, misrepresentation and disintegration.  
First of all, the Governing Council (whose membership is reserved to the Central Banks of the 
Euro area) is formally responsible for the decision-making, while the Supervisory Board 
                                                          
46
 Article 17, EBA Regulation. 
47
 Article 18, EBA regulation, in particular (4).  
48
 Article 19(4), EBA Regulation. 
49
 Article 19(5), EBA Regulation. 
50
 See Moloney (above, n.1) 
10 
 
(comprising all the participating Member States' representatives) is in charge of the 
preparatory works (draft supervisory decisions). Even if there is a silent non-objection 
procedure, meaning that the decision is deemed adopted unless the Governing Council 
opposed to it within 10 working days,51 this differentiation of treatment is not acceptable 
politically. Indeed, it does not represent an incentive for non-euro Member States to join.  
Secondly, the governance arrangement adopted to circumvent the fact that the current 
framework cannot permit the inclusion of the non-euro Member States within the ECB’s 
Governing Council is not adequate either. The 'close cooperation agreement' provides for 
reduced memberships rights in the SSM, compared to the euro Member States. For instance, 
if a non-euro Member State disagrees with a decision from the Governing Council, the ECB 
could suspend or terminate the close cooperation agreement.52 This termination prevents 
any new close cooperation agreement during three years.  
As a consequence of these two observations, the lack of incentives to join the BU for non-
euro Member States is clear.  
Thirdly, this split between Euro area Member states and non-participating countries might 
compromise the financial integration in the whole EU. This is at odds with the financial 
trilemma theorized by Schoenmaker.53 The theory brings out three elements – financial 
stability, financial integration and national financial policies – which are incompatible. Only 
two objectives out of the three can be pursued at the same time. Schoenmaker's perspective 
in 2011 relied specifically on the locus of the production of financial stability as a public good. 
As Howarth and Quaglia have proposed, one may extend this analysis to banking supervision 
policies.54 Thus, both the context of financial integration (with high cross-border banking in 
the EU) and the aim to conduct banking supervision require supranational level policies. This 
shows the discrepancy of the current position of non-participating Member States outside 
the Banking Union, as they are equally concerned by the financial integration and the 
necessity to supervise banks.  
                                                          
51
 Article 26, SSM Regulation. 
52
 Article 26(8), SSM Regulation. 
53
 D. Schoenmaker, 'The Financial Trilemma', (2011), Economic Letters, Vol. 111, p. 57-58. 
54
 D. Howarth and L. Quaglia, ‘Internationalized Banking and National Preferences on European Central Bank 
Supervision’ (2016), West European Politics, forthcoming, May 2016. 'Financial policies' could cover regulation, 
supervision, financial support and resolution.  
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However, besides this trilemma, the configuration of national banking systems must be 
taken into account, including the following criteria: the degree of banking system 
concentration, the degree of internationalization, the exposure to euro area periphery and 
the degree of foreign bank penetration. In this respect, Howarth and Quaglia studied seven 
national banking systems (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and The 
Netherlands) and their 'internationalization patterns'55 to analyze national preferences 
expressed on the threshold for direct ECB supervision. Euro area Member States' 
preferences resulting from distinct national banking systems shaped the SSM's design and in 
particular the criteria to distinguish between 'significant' and 'less significant' credit 
institutions, respectively under ECB's and NCAs' supervision in the current legal framework 
(Article 6(4), SSM Regulation).  
The study of non-euro area Member States' national preferences, depending on their 
'internationalization patterns', may demonstrate if the actual SSM design is appealing for 
them56 and if they would accept a supranational oversight. Actually, the factual evidence of 
stagnant57 or lack of close cooperation agreements is not reassuring in that sense.   
Another non euro Member State perspective worth considering is that of the UK. The 
country remains really concerned by preserving the integrity of the Financial Single Market 
as a whole in its economic interests and because of the importance of cross-border activities 
in financial services business. Its place as a global financial centre depends partially on its 
position as an entry point to the EU Market. That is why the UK insisted on the EBA's voting 
reform (supra). The UK is 'too big to be marginalised' but does keep watching over the 
Internal Market banking governance system, not being subsumed by the Banking Union.58 
4. Revisions: EU Secondary Law evolution; EU Primary Law evolution 
                                                          
55
 Ibid. 'Internationalization patterns' include both 'the international exposure of national banks' and 'the 
foreign bank presence in the banking system'. Howarth and Quaglia emphasize in particular the 'EU 
internationalization' of national banking systems.  
56
 There is an opportunity for further research in this sense, prolonging the analytical framework used for the 
seven countries aforementioned, and testing Howarth and Quaglia's hypothesis (ibid.) : 'The greater the reach 
of internationalization into the national banking system, the greater the support for direct ECB supervision of a 
larger number of smaller euro area banks'). 
57
 Bulgaria and Romania are in discussions with the ECB. One of the reasons for Romania is the domination of 
the domestic banking system by euro area banks. Moreover, elimination of jurisdictional arbitrage and creation 
of a more competitive market are expected. (M. Isarescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, Speech in 
Rome, 10 July 2014). 
58
 See Moloney, above n.1 
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 During the crisis, broad interpretation of the Treaty provisions saved the decision-
makers from paralysis. Current legal challenges could be resolved with different techniques, 
from short term to long term. 
At the level of secondary legislation, one could advocate for greater harmonisation by 
adopting directly applicable EU regulations rather than directives. 59  Additionally, this 
framework could include legal obligations for information exchange, cooperation, and prior 
consultation between all relevant players. For instance, a role for the cross-representation in 
the respective governance structures is a relevant evolution and could overcome the 
imbalanced relationships between the ECB and the EBA.  
In the long run, the establishment of an explicit financial stability objective for the EU under 
the Treaties could be inserted in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, after paragraph 
4 providing for the Economic and Monetary Union. It would enhance the financial stability 
powers assigned to EU institutions and bodies within the whole EU, guaranteeing the 
inclusiveness of the non-participating Member States' authorities 'so that actions from 
national and supranational entities are consistent'.60 A revision of the ECB's mandate could 
reflect the specificities of its tasks, by inserting a chapter on financial policy or even on 
Banking Union within the Title VIII on EMU in the TFEU61 and by including other related 
provisions in the ECB Statute. Regarding the SSM, it would allow autonomous governance 
arrangements to rebalance the institutional representation between euro Member States 
and non-euro Member States. Supervisory decision-making powers would no longer rely 
upon the Governing Council as the ultimate decision-making body. The ultimate step 
proposed by some authors is the entire transfer of exclusive responsibilities for supervision 
at the EU level. It is worth noting that the imperfect place of the non-euro Member States is 
expressly recognised in the legislation itself, which indicates expected evolution:62 'Article 
127(6) TFEU could be amended (...) to eliminate some of the legal constraints it currently 
                                                          
59
 Seen as one of the solution to avoid a 'multi-tiered legal articulation of the Single Rulebook' and ' further 
reflections at the political level, in particular with a view to increasing the adoption of Regulations and 
restricting the enactment of Directives to the very specific areas where maximum harmonization is not yet 
possible'. Enria, above, n.24, p.6. 
60
 IMF Country Report, 'European Union: Financial System Stability Assessment', (2013) No. 13/75, IMF, §30, 
p.22. 
61
 By inserting an additional Chapter after the Monetary policy.  
62
 A Report is said to be published by December 31, 2016 to assess the opportunities of further developing the 
SSM, including at the level of primary law. 
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places on the design of the SSM',63 and especially going beyond the model of 'close 
cooperation' granting equal rights in the ECB's decision-making for the non-euro 
participating Member States,64 saying implicitly that the actual institutional arrangement 
leading to unequal representation is unsatisfactory.65  
 The joining of non-euro Member States to the SSM will evidently create the 
conditions for further integration in the BU, as part of the EMU. However, without any 
revision of the Treaties, they will still face institutional representational risks. Indeed, the 
lack of representation in the ECB Governing Council entails a risk of loss of sovereignty.  
 In sum, there is a case to be made in favour of legislative amendments since the 
various regulators are unlikely to be able to overcome weak institutional design by 
pragmatic, incremental solutions. 
 
                                                          
63
 Recital 85, SSM Regulation.  
64
 Article 32(n), SSM Regulation. 
65
 Governance arrangements concerning the composition and the voting arrangements in the Supervisory 
Board and its relation with the Governing Council is to be evaluated as well, article 32(g), SSM Regulation. 
